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                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                           __________ 
 
                          No. 01-2436 
                           __________ 
                                 
                 PAULA E. CAPPALLI, IN HER OWN 
             NAME AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF A CLASS, 
                                              Appellant 
                                 
                                v. 
                                 
                         *NORDSTROM FSB 
                                 
         *(Amended in accordance with Clerk's Order dated 6/27/01) 
                           __________ 
                                 
        ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
            FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
                   D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-04454 
     District Judge:  The Honorable Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr. 
                           __________ 
                                 
           Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                       February 12, 2002 
                           __________ 
                                 
       Before: MANSMANN, McKEE, and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
                                 
              (Opinion Filed:  February 15, 2002) 
                          ____________ 
                                 
                       MEMORANDUM OPINION 
                          ____________ 
                                 
 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
     Paula Cappalli brought a putative class action suit against a 
national credit bank 
currently known as Nordstrom fsb (the "Bank").  Cappalli alleged that the 
fee she was 
charged after making a late payment on her Nordstrom credit card account 
violated the 
Home Owner's Loan Act ("HOLA"), 12 U.S.C.  1463(g).  The Bank filed a 
motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
The District 
Court  granted the Bank's motion, finding that Cappalli failed to state a 
claim upon which 
relief could be granted. We agree and will affirm.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.  1291.   
     To receive her Nordstrom credit card, Cappalli signed a cardholder 
agreement, 
thereby entering into a written agreement with the Bank.  In relevant 
part, the cardholder 
agreement stated:   
               3.   Promise to Pay.  I agree to pay . . . for all 
purchases and cash 
          advances, including applicable Finance Charges and other charges 
or 
          fees incurred by me . . . 
                
               4.   Monthly Payments.  Each month, I agree to pay at least 
the Total 
          Minimum Payment shown on my monthly billing statement no later 
          than the Payment Due date shown on the monthly billing 
statement. 
           
                         *     *     * 
      
                    6. (d)    The Monthly Periodic Rate of Finance Charge 
on my account is 
               1.75% (corresponding ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE 21%). 
 
                         *     *     * 
                                 
               11.  Late Payment Fee.  If the "Current Due" shown on my 
monthly billing 
          statement . . . is not paid within 10 days after the scheduled 
Payment Due 
          shown on my monthly billing statement, [the Bank] may charge me 
and I 
          agree to pay a Late Payment of $20. 
      
                         *     *     * 
                                 
               15.  Governing Law.  I understand that this Agreement is 
governed by 
          and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States.  
To 
          the extent state law applies to this Agreement, this Agreement 
will 
          be governed by the laws of the state of Arizona. 
           
App. at 20-22.   
     In April 2000, Cappalli received a billing statement from the Bank 
that showed an 
unpaid balance of $101.72 and indicated that a payment was due on May 13, 
2000.  
Cappalli's husband mailed a check to the Bank for $101.72 on May 29, 2000 
sixteen 
days after the due date.  In June 2000, Cappalli received a statement 
showing a balance of 
$22.88.  The new balance consisted of a $20 late payment fee and $2.88 in 
periodic 
finance charges that had accrued on the unpaid balance in May.  On appeal, 
Cappalli 
argues that the $22.88 the Bank billed her represented an interest charge 
of 391% in 
violation of her cardholder agreement and HOLA.  
     Section 1463(g) of HOLA provides, in relevant part, that "a 
[national] savings 
association may charge interest on any extension of credit . . . at the 
rate allowed by the 
laws of the State in which such savings association is located . . . ."  
18 U.S.C.  
1463(g)(1). Under the regulatory scheme of HOLA, late payment fees are 
considered 
"interest."  12 C.F.R.  560.110(a); see also Smiley v. Citibank (South 
Dakota), N.A., 517 
U.S. 735, 740 (1996).  Thus, we must determine whether the late payment 
charged by the 
Bank resulted in interest charges that exceeded the limits imposed by the 
laws of the state 
of Arizona. 
     The general usury statute in Arizona provides that, "Interest on any 
loan, 
indebtedness, judgement or other obligation shall be at the rate of ten 
percent per annum 
unless a different rate is contracted for in writing, in which event any 
rate of interest may 
be agreed to."  Ariz. Rev. Stat.  44-1201(A) (emphasis added).  In this 
case, Cappalli 
and the Bank entered into a credit agreement that established a 21% Annual 
Percentage 
Rate ("APR") and a $20 late payment fee.  Cappalli argues that Section 44-
1201(A) 
requires parties to establish a single rate of interest because the 
statute states that parties 
may contract for  "a" different rate.  Because both the APR and late fee 
payments are 
considered "interest" under 12 C.F.R.  560.110(a), Cappalli argues that 
having two 
different "rates" of interest violates the alleged requirement of a single 
rate. 
     As the District Court noted, however, "there is nothing in either 
Smiley or  
560.110(a) that requires that the [APR] assessed on outstanding balances 
be treated as a 
ceiling that controls all . . . terms of the cardholder agreement that 
might fall under the 
definition of 'interest.'"  Dist. Ct. Op. at 6.  In other words, parties 
are free to contract for 
a different APR rate and a different late payment fee.  Even if the Bank 
had wanted to 
combine the charges into a single figure, the Truth in Lending Act 
("TILA") and its 
supporting regulations prohibit parties from including late fees within 
the APR.  15 
U.S.C.  1601 et. seq.; Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R.  226.14(b), 226.6.  
Thus, not only was 
the separation of the APR and late payment fee permissible, it was 
required by law. 
     In the alternative, Cappalli argues that two other Arizona statutes 
prohibited the 
amount of the late fee.  Sections 44-1205(B) and 44-6002(F) of the Arizona 
Revised 
Statutes place limits on how much banks may charge for late payments.  
Section 44- 
1205(B) applies to "revolving credit accounts," while Section 44-6002(F) 
applies to 
"retail charge accounts."  Cappalli asserts that the account she held with 
the Bank 
qualifies under both statutes.  Whether Sections 44-1205(B) or 44-6002(F) 
apply here, 
however, is irrelevant under the most favored lender doctrine. 
     The most favored lender doctrine states that "A [national] savings 
association 
located in a state may charge interest at the maximum rate permitted to 
any state- 
chartered or licensed lending institution by the law of that state."  12 
C.F.R.  560.110(b)  
(emphasis added); see also Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. 
409, 413 
(1873).  Section 44-1201(A) is the general usury statute in Arizona.  See, 
e.g., Aros v. 
Beneficial Arizona, Inc., 977 P.2d 784, 786 (Ariz. 1999); Morrison v. 
Shanwick Int'l 
Corp., 804 P.2d 768, 775 (Ariz. App. 1990).  Thus, the Bank was permitted 
to charge 
Cappalli both the APR and late payment fee because, as discussed above, 
Section 44- 
1201(A) permitted the Bank to charge "any rate of interest" to which the 
parties agreed.  
     For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the dismissal of Cappalli's 
suit.  
 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
     Kindly file the foregoing Memorandum Opinion. 
 
 
                                   /s/  Maryanne Trump Barry                       
                                   Circuit Judge 
 
